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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 6 MONROVIA 5272

DEPARTMENT PASS ACDA, AID/W

SECDEF FOR JCS

E.O. 11652 GDS
TAGS: MASS, LI
SUBJECT: ANNUAL INTEGRATED SECURITY ASSISTANCE REPORT FOR FY 80 - 82;
LIBERIA

REFS: (A) STATE 167901 DTG 03083Z JULY 78
(B) MONROVIA A-6, FEBRUARY 19, 1978 (C) CLIBMISH,
LETTER DATED NOVEMBER 23, 1977 - SUBJECT: MSAP FY 80 - 84
AS MODIFIED BY USCINCEUR (D) STATE 066872
(E) MONROVIA 0378 (F) MONROVIA 1343 (G) MONROVIA 1464
(H) MONROVIA 1867

1. (U) IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFTTEL A, THE ANNUAL INTEGRATED
SECURITY ASSISTANCE REPORT FOR FY 80-82 IS SUBMITTED.

2. (U) PENDING RECEIPT OF PRESCRIBED FORMATS, THIS
INITIAL REPORT IS KEYED TO THE APPROPRIATE PARAGRAPHS IN
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REFTEL A.

3. 3A(1)(S) U.S. INTERESTS AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE
OBJECTIVES. THE LONG-STANDING SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE GOL, BASED ON HISTORY AND ON
BLOOD RELATIONSHIPS, HAS RESULTED IN THE ACCUMULATION
OF A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT U.S. INTERESTS IN LIBERIA, SOME

RELATED TO TRADE AND OTHERS TO THE ABILITY OF THE U.S.
TO PROJECT ITS INFLUENCE ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT.
IN ADDITION, A 1959 COOPERATION AGREEMENT STIPULATES
"IN THE EVENT OF AGRESSION OR THREAT OF AGGRESSION
AGAINST LIBERIA, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA WILL IMMEDIATELY
DETERMINE WHAT ACTION MAY BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE
DEFENSE OF LIBERIA." ON THE STRATEGIC SIDE, OUR INTERESTS
INCLUDE

-- THE USE, GRANTED BY EXCHANGE OF NOTES, OF ROBERTS
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IN EVENT OF A NATIONAL EMERGENCY
(IN ACTUAL FACT, THE AIRPORT REMAINS AVAILABLE TO US
WITHOUT RESTRICTION FOR OPERATIONAL SUPPORT OF U.S.
POLICY OBJECTIVES IN AFRICA).

-- THE RIGHT, PROVIDED IN A CONFIDENTIAL EXCHANGE OF
NOTES, TO ESTABLISH MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AT THE PORT
OF MONROVIA SHOULD THEY BECOME NECESSARY FOR THE MAIN-
TENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

-- MAINTENANCE OF A VOA RELAY STATION.

-- MAINTENANCE OF AN AREA TELECOMMUNICATIONS OFFICE
PROVIDING COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES FOR 26 OF OUR
EMBASSIES IN AFRICA.

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-- MAINTENANCE OF AN OMEGA NAVIGATIONSL STATION.
ON THE ECONOMIC SIDE, THE VALUE OF U.S. INVESTMENT IN
LIBERIA EXCEEDS \$750 MILLION. LIBERIA IS A MAJOR U.S.
SOURCE OF NATURAL RUBBER AND IS AFRICA'S PRINCIPAL
EXPORTER OF IRON ORE.

SPECIFIC SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES FOR LIBERIA
FROM THE STANDPOINT OF PROTECTION OF U.S. INTERESTS ARE
AS FOLLOWS:

A. ASSIST IN MAINTAINING ACCESS TO THE SEA AND
AIRPORT FACILITIES PROVIDED FOR IN EXCHANGES OF NOTES;

B. ASSIST IN MAINTAINING ACCESS TO OTHER FACILITIES
INCLUDING THE U.S. DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS
COMPLEX AND THE VOICE OF AMERICA STATIONS, WHICH ENHANCE
THE PROJECTION OF U.S. INFLUENCE INTO SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA;

C. PROMOTE FAVORABLE BILATERAL RELATIONS;

D. HELP IMPROVE THE OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF LIBERIA'S MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, WITH EMPHASIS ON PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE OFFICER CORPS AND THE INTERNAL SECURITY MISSION TO INCLUDE DEVELOPMENT OF APPROPRIATE ORGANIZATIONS, COMMUNICATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS; AND

E. ASSIST IN PRESERVING U.S. MARKET ACCESS TO THE RUBBER, TIMBER, IRON AND OTHER MINERAL RESOURCES OF LIBERIA.

THESE SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES SUPPORT THE ASSIGNED U.S. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES AS ELABORATED IN REF B. THESE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES ARE:

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(1) MAINTENANCE OF EXISTING ADVANTAGES AND PRIVILEGES RELATING TO U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS UNIQUE TO LIBERIA.

(2) MAINTENANCE OF CLOSE BILATERAL RELATIONS.

(3) A CLOSER SECURITY RELATIONSHIP.

(4) INCREASED TRADE AND INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES.

(5) PROGRESS TOWARD LIBERIAN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT.

(6) FACILITATE U.S. MISSION LIBERIA'S REGIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES.

THOSE SPECIFIC SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES FOR THE ARMED FORCES OF LIBERIA, AS SUBMITTED IN FY 80 - 84 MSAP, ARE ENDORSED AND ENUMERATED BELOW:

A. GENERAL

(1) RECRUIT AND RETAIN SUFFICIENT TRAINABLE PERSONNEL TO ACHIEVE OBJECTIVE FORCE LEVELS.

(2) ACQUIRE/MODERNIZE MILITARY EQUIPMENT NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH MILITARY DEFENSIVE AND NATION-BUILDING OBJECTIVES.

(3) ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN HIGH STANDARDS OF TRAINING, DISCIPLINE, AND PROFESSIONALISM.

(4) BUILD AND RETAIN AN ADEQUATE ADMINISTRATIVE,
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MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY SUPPORT BASE.

(4) IMPROVE COMMAND AND CONTROL AND LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS - LOC.

B. LIBERIAN NATIONAL GUARD

(1) REPLACE/UPGRADE OBSOLETE OR WORNOUT MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR THREE INFANTRY BATTALIONS.

(2) DEVELOP A DEPENDABLE TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM.

(3) REORGANIZE THE ENGINEER BATTALION AND REPLACE/UPGRADE THEIR EQUIPMENT TO IMPROVE THE CAPABILITY TO CONSTRUCT LOC AND OTHER NATION BUILDING PROJECTS.

(4) IMPROVE THE INDIGENOUS TRAINING BASE TO:

(A) REDUCE RELIANCE ON IMET.

(B) PROVIDE A SOURCE OF SKILLED, PROFESSIONAL MANPOWER.

(C) DEVELOP AN EFFECTIVE UNIT TRAINING PROGRAM.

(5) ESTABLISH AND FOSTER A STRONG PROGRAM OF SELF-HELP TO IMPROVE MORALE AND WELFARE.

(6) REFINE STAFF ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES IN THE AREAS OF ADMINISTRATION, PLANNING,

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DEPARTMENT PASS ACDA, AID/W

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SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE.

C. LIBERIAN NATIONAL COAST GUARD

(1) ACQUIRE ADDITIONAL PATROL CRAFT AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT.

(2) IMPROVE STANDARD OF INDIVIDUAL AND CREW TRAINING.

(3) IMPROVE LOGISTIC/SUPPLY SYSTEM AND PROGRAMS.

(4) CONSTRUCT ADDITIONAL CG STATIONS.

4. 3A (2) (S) STATEMENT OF THE THREAT (LIBERIAN PERCEPTION).

A. INTERNAL THREAT:

NO SERIOUS THREAT HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED. GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS ARE AIMED AT DEFUSING THE POSSIBLE SOURCES OF DISCONTENT BY RAISING LIVING STANDARDS, IMPROVING EDUCATION AND COMBATTING TRIBALISM. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE HAS PRIVATELY EXPRESSED HIS
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CONCERN OVER TWO POSSIBLE FUTURE INTERNAL PROBLEMS. THE INCREASING EFFECTIVENESS OF ISLAMIC PROSELYTIZING, AND THE INCREASING INFLUENCE AND ECONOMIC POWER OF GUINEAN MUSLINS NOW RESIDENT, ACCORDING TO THE MINISTER, IN LARGE NUMBERS IN THE INLAND COUNTIES. HE HAS EXPRESSED A SUSPICION THAT MONEY MAY BE INVOLVED AND PROGRAM TO SUPPLANT THE PRESENT CHRISTIAN ELITE WITH AN ISLAMIC ONE. THIS ALARMISM IS NOT SHARED BY THE GOL GENERALLY.

SECONDLY, THE MINISTRY HAS SPECULATED THAT SHOULD PRESIDENT TOLBERT PASS HIS MANTLE TO A MORE PROGRESSIVE SUCCESSOR, THE POWERFUL CONSERVATIVE ELEMENTS WITHIN THE TRUE WHIG PARTY MIGHT INTERVENE TO BLOCK THE TRANSFER OF POWER. AGAIN, THE MINISTER IS IN A MINORITY IN THIS FEAR AS MOST LIBERIANS FORESEE A PEACEFUL TRANSITION OF POWER.

B. EXTERNAL THREAT:

NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES ARE FRIENDLY AND ALTHOUGH GUINEA MAY BE CAPABLE OF MOUNTING A LIMITED CONVENTIONAL MILITARY OPERATION, THE GOVERNMENT REALIZES THAT SUCH A POSSIBILITY IS UNLIKELY. WITHIN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, HOWEVER, THERE IS SOME UNEASE OVER SUCH AN ASSESSMENT. THERE IS A LINGERING DISTRUST OF GUINEAN RELIABILITY BASED ON HISTORICAL FACTORS, ON THE PRESENT ASSOCIATION OF THE GOG WITH COMMUNIST POWERS AND ON THE SOMETIMES ERRATIC BEHAVIOR OF ITS LEADERSHIP. LIBERIAN COMPARISONS OF THEIR OWN AND NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES' ARMED FORCES DO NOT REASSURE THEM. GUINEA, FOR INSTANCE, HAS 150 SOVIET AND 364 CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN COUNTRY COMPARED TO SIX U.S. MILITARY IN LIBERIA; 9,000 MEN UNDER ARMS COMPARED TO LIBERIA'S 4,400; 60 TANKS TO LIBERIA'S SIX ARMORED CARS; AND 19 JET FIGHTER AIRCRAFT, 17 TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT, AND EIGHT HELICOPTERS

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TO LIBERIA'S SIX LIGHT, UNARMED OBSERVATION AIRCRAFT. IN ADDITION, GUINEA HAS AT LEAST A 10 TO 1 ADVANTAGE OVER LIBERIA IN OTHER WEAPONS AND WEAPONS-RELATED EQUIPMENT. IN SPITE OF THIS DISPARITY, MUTUAL INTERESTS AND FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS LOWER THE PROBABILITY OF AN INTERNAL THREAT. FURTHERMORE, SEKOU TOURE, PRESIDENT OF GUINEA, RESPECTS PRESIDENT TOLBERT AND IS GRATEFUL TO HIM FOR SPONSORING THE "MONROVIA SUMMIT" IN MARCH 1978 WHICH FACILITATED A RECONCILIATION BETWEEN GUINEA AND SENEGAL AND GUINEA AND THE IVORY COAST.

C. GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA'S STRATEGY:

THE GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA REALIZES THAT IT CANNOT COMPETE MILITARILY WITH THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES AND SEES NO NEED TO DO SO. PRESIDENT TOLBERT STRIVES TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH OTHER WEST AFRICAN NATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA DOES BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN A SMALL EFFECTIVE ARMED FORCE CAPABLE OF PROVIDING A MINIMUM DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY AGAINST EXTERNAL AGGRESSION AND CAPABLE OF PRESERVING INTERNAL SECURITY.

5. 3A(3)(S) THE MISSION'S PERCEPTION OF THE INTERNAL THREAT. THERE IS NO LIKELIHOOD OF A SERIOUS THREAT TO SECURITY ARISING FROM INTERNAL SOURCES WITHIN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. THE MOSLEM POPULATION IS PEACEFUL AND LAW-ABIDING, AND THE GOVERNMENT MAINTAINS CLOSE LINKS WITH THESE ELEMENTS. POLITICAL AWARENESS IS GROWING IN THE STUDENT POPULATION AND HAS A STRONG RADICAL (MARXIST) TINGE, BUT DOES NOT YET CONSTITUTE A THREAT.

A. EXTERNAL THREAT:

UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS, A THREAT OR ATTACK FROM EXTERNAL SOURCES IS EXTREMELY UNLIKELY. UNDER OTHER

CONDITIONS, HOWEVER, THE CONTRAST BETWEEN THE SMALL SIZE OF THE GOL ARMED FORCES AND THE MUCH LARGER AND MORE SOPHISTICATED FORCES OF GUINEA COULD BECOME A TEMPTATION TO PUT LIBERIA UNDER PRESSURE. THE MISSION FEELS THAT

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PRUDENCE DICTATES THAT THE GOL AT LEAST KEEP ITS PRESENT SMALL ARMED FORCES ADEQUATELY TRAINED AND EQUIPPED, AS A NECESSARY SUPPLEMENT TO ITS DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS. WE ALSO MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THE GROWING CUBAN/SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFRICA JUSTIFIABLY MAKES THE GOVERNMENT'S MODERATE LEADERSHIP APPREHENSIVE.

6. 3A(4) (C) THE FORCE STRUCTURE LIBERIA BELIEVES SUITED TO MEET ITS REQUIREMENTS IS AS FOLLOWS:

FORCE STRUCTURE:	NO. OF UNITS	
ARMED FORCES OF LIBERIA		
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS	1	
SERVICE SUPPORT BN.	1	
LOGISTICS COMMAND	1	
TRAINING COMMAND	1	
ENGINEER BN.	1	
SIGNAL CO.	1	
AIR RECONNAISSANCE UNIT	1	
NATIONAL COAST GUARD (NO. OF PERSONNEL)		270
NATIONAL GUARD BDE.	1	
EXEC. MANSION BN.	(1)	
FIELD ARTY. BN.	(1)	
INFANTRY BN.	(2)	
TERRITORIAL SECURITY BN.	(3)	
SCOUT PLT.	(1)	
TOTAL STRENGTH (NO. OF PERSONNEL)		6,100

7. 3A(5)(C) U.S. MISSION CONCURS WITH GOL PERCEPTION OF TYPE OF FORCE REQUIRED TO MEET POTENTIAL THREATS. THE FORCE CONSTITUTES THE MINIMUM FORCE CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS, INVOLVES NO SOPHISTICATED HARDWARE, REQUIRES NO ELABORATE OR UNUSUAL MANAGERIAL OR LOGISTICAL ASSETS TO CONTROL

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THE FORCE, DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSIVE THREAT TO

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DEPARTMENT PASS ACDA, AID/W

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ITS NEIGHBORS, AND DOES CONTRIBUTE TO THE MILITARY
STABILITY OF THE REGION. THIS FORCE SHOULD BE EQUIPPED
AND TRAINED TO BE CAPABLE OF PROVIDING A SMALL CONTINGENT
TO PARTICIPATE IN REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES IF
NECESSARY.

8. 3A(6)(C) A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF DEFENSE SPENDING.
LIBERIA HISTORICALLY SPENDS A VERY LOW PERCENT OF ITS
TOTAL REVENUES FOR DEFENSE. AS THE ATTACHED TABLE
SHOWS, THE DEFENSE EFFORT IS ONLY ABOUT 3 PERCENT TO
4 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL BUDGET. OF THIS AMOUNT, BETTER
THAN 65 PERCENT IS FOR PERSONNEL SERVICES. MILITARY
IMPORTS COMPRISE LESS THAN ONE-HALF OF ONE
PERCENT OF THE TOTAL IMPORTS AND VIRTUALLY ALL MAJOR
MILITARY IMPORTS ARE FROM THE U.S. THE DEBT SERVICING
REQUIREMENT FOR DEFENSE MATERIEL FOR FY 76, 77 AND 78
COMPRISED ABOUT 10 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL DEFENSE BUDGET
AND LESS THAN 4 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL DEBT SERVICING
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REQUIREMENT OF THE GOL. LIBERIA DOES NOT NOW HAVE A
DEBT SERVICING PROBLEM AND LENDERS VIEW THE GOL AS A
GOOD CREDIT RISK. THOUGH PROJECTIONS OF LIBERIA'S DEBT

SERVICE AS A PERCENTAGE OF REVENUE FOR FY 78/79 INCREASED
TO ABOUT 22 PERCENT FROM 15 PERCENT IN THE PREVIOUS
FISCAL YEAR, MOST ECONOMIC OBSERVERS FEEL LIBERIA CAN
HANDLE THIS LEVEL OF DEBT WITHOUT TOO MUCH DIFFICULTY.

LIBERIA ECONOMIC INDICATORS

	FY77	FY78	FY79	FY80	FU81	FY82
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POPULATION

TOTAL

(MILLIONS)	1.70	1.75	1.81	1.87	1.93	1.99
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MALE LABOR

FORCE IN ARMED FORCES

(PERCENT)	1	1	1	1	1	1
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GROSS DOMESTIC

PRODUCT (GDP)

GDP

\$.BILLIONS)	.654	.695	.743	.794	.899	.908
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PER CAPITA

GDP (\$)	389	397	410	424	439	456
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DEFENSE EFFORT

(\$-MILLIONS)

SELF-FINANCED	9.9	9.7	10.4	11.1	11.74	12.6
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IMETP	.09	.23	.23	.23	.23	.23
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TOTAL DEFENSE

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EFFORT	9.99	9.93	10.63	11.33	11.97	12.83
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DEFENSE EFFORT

INDICATORS

SELF-FINANCED

EXPENDITURES

AS PERCENT OF

GDP	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4
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AS PERCENT

ANNUAL BUDGET	4.4	3.0	3.0	2.9	3.1	3.0
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FOREIGN PURCHASE

OF DEF. ITEMS

(\$-MILLIONS)

U.S. FINANCED	1.74	.54	.54	1.6	1.6	2.6
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U.S. COMMERCIAL	.06	.10	.15	.38	.31	.35
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OTHER COUNTRIES .02 .03 .03 .03 .03 .03

9. 3A(7)(S) PROJECTION OF DEFENSE ARTICLES LIKELY TO BE SOUGHT BY LIBERIA. REFERENCE IS MADE TO THE MSAP FY 80 -84 SUBMISSION.

10. 3A(8)(C) AN ASSESSMENT OF EACH ITEM PROJECTED TO BE SOUGHT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA DURING FY 80 - 82 AS SUBMITTED IN THE FY 80 - 84 MSAP.

AERONAUTICAL - CESSNA 185, FY 80, 1 EA., CESSNA 172, FY 82, 1 EA.: PURCHASE OF THESE AIRCRAFT WILL MODERNIZE AND REPLENISH THE SMALL AFL AIRWIGN CAPIBLITY TO PERFORM RECONNAISSANCE AND SUPPLY MISSIONS WITHIN LIBERIA. THESE AIRCRAFT REPLACE LIKE AIRCRAFT WHICH HAVE BECOME OVERAGE AND UNECONOMICAL TO REPAIR.

NAVAL - PATROL BOAT (PGM), FY 80, 1 EA., PATROL
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BOAT, 65 FOOT, FY 81, 2 EA.: THE GOL HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY CONCERNED WITH ITS RESPOBSIBILITIES TOWARD PATROLING ITS EXPANDED TERRITORIAL WATERS (TO 200 MILES); PROTECTING IT S COASTAL FISHERIES, EFFECTING HARBOR SECUIRYT AND PROVIDING A SEA RESCUE CAPABILITY.THE DESIRED ACQUISITION OF ONE PATROL BOAT IN FY 80 AND TWO ADDITIONAL CRAFT IN FY 81 WOULD PROVIDE THE PHYSICAL MEANS FOR THE COAST GUARD TO ACCOMPLISH THESE MISSIONS.

GROUND MOBILITY - TRUCKS: THE PROPOSED VEHICLE ACQUISITIONS CONSTITUTE A CONTINUAL VEHICLE REPLENISHMENT PROGRAM TO REPLACE OBSOLETE, NON-ECONOMICALLY REPAIRABLE VEHICLES. SINCE THE CESSATION OF MAP IN 1973, VEHICLE PROCUREMENT HAS NOT BEEN SUFFICIENT TO MAINTAIN THE VEHICLE FLEET. PROCUREMENT OF THE DESIRED GROUND MOBIITY EQUIPMENT DOES NOT REPRESENT AN EXPANSION OF THEIR MILITARY CAPABILITY BUT RATHER A RESTORATION AND MAINTENANCE OF FORMER CAPABILITIES.

COMMAND AND CONTROL: THE DESIRED COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT IS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE THE RECOGNIZED INFANTRY BATTALIONS WITH A MINIMUM COMMAND AND MANEUVER CONTROL CAPAILITY. ANNUAL ACQUISITIONS ARE DESIGNED TO MAINTAIN THIS CAPABILITY THROUGH REPLENISHMENT OF EQUIPMENT DEPLETED THROUGH NORMAL ATTRITION. ALL RADIOS REQUESTED STANDARD SMALL UNIT TACTICAL CONTROL SYSTEMS.

WEAPONS: ALL WEAPONS FEQUESTED ARE SMALLER THAN 75MM AND ARE REQUESTED TO EQUIP THE THREE BATTALION

TACTICAL GROUND FORCE. WEAPON ACQUISITIONS MODERNIZE
BUT DO NOT EXPAND THE AFL'S TACTICAL CAPABILITY. THE
M16A1 RIFLES REPLACE OBSOLETE M1 .30 CAL. RIFLES, THE
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M60 MACHINE GUN REPLACES AN EVEN MORE OBSOLETE M1919A6.30
CAL. MACHINE GUN. LIKEWISE THE OTHER WAPONS REQUESTED
REPLACE OBSOLETE OVERAGE AND NON-SUPPORTABLE WEAPONS.
WEAPONS PURCHASED AFTER FY 81 WOULD BE MERELY TO
REPLENISH WEAPON STOCKS DEPLETED THROUGH NORMAL
ATTRITION.

OTHER ARTICLES AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT

AMMUNITION: USE OF FMS CREDITS TO PURCHASE
AMMUNITION IS REQUESTED TO ESTABLISH A MINIMUM WAR
RESERVE WHICH THE GOL DOES NOT NOW HAVE. THE AMOUNTS
PROJECTED ARE THE ESTIMATED MINIMUM AMOUNTS TO PROVIDE
A BASIC DEFENSE CAPABILITY. TRAINING AMMUNITION AND
REPLENISHMENT OF STOCKS WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED ON A CASH
BASIS. CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT: PURCHASE OF THE PRO-
JECTED CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT IS DESIGNED TO MAINTAIN
THE CIVIL WORK CIVIC ACTION CAPABILITY OF THE ENGINEER
BATTALION AS PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED THROUGH A SYSTEMATIC
PROGRAM OF EQUIPMENT REPLENISHMENT.

UNIT AND INDIVIDUAL FIELD EQUIPMENT: PURCHASE OF
UNIT AND INDIVIDUAL FIELD EQUIPMENT EQUIPS THE MODERNIZED
THREE BATTALION TACTICAL GROUND FORCE. EQUIPMENT IS BASIC
CANVAS, WEB AND MESS GEAR NECESSARY TO ENABLE THE
BATTALIONS TO CONDUCT SUSTAINED OPERATIONS IN THE FIELD.

11. 3A(9)(C) ECONOMIC IMPACT ASSESSMENT. LIBERIA'S
DEFENSE BUDGET OF \$9 MILLION REPRESENTS LESS THAN THREE
PERCENT OF TOTAL PLANNED FY 78/79 EXPENDITURE OF \$340
MILLION, AND IS WELL BELOW 10 PERCENT OF THE GOL'S \$160
MILLION DEVELOPMENT BUDGET THE DEFENSE EXPENDITURE OF
LIBERIA DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC
BURDEN, AND IN SOME INSTANCES HAS A MODEST EFFECT ON

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DEPARTMENT PASS ACDA, AID/W

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LIBERIA'S DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. FOR EXAMPLE, THE
ENGINEER AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT NOW OWNED BY THE AFL HAVE
BEEN USED ON NATION-BUILDING CONSTRUCTION AND AGRICULTURAL
PROJECTS. ALSO, THE AFL ARE CONSTRUCTING THEIR OWN HOUSING
AND FACILITIES, THUS FREEING DEVELOPMENT FUNDS FOR USE
IN OTHER PROJECTS. WITH THE ACQUISITION OF COAST GUARD
PATROL BOATS, THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE FEELS THAT IT CAN
IMPROVE THE EFFICIENCY OF COAST AND HARBOR PATROLLING,
PRODUCING INCREASED REVENUES FOR THE GOL THROUGH THE
COLLECTION OF ADDITIONAL FINES AND TARIFFS.

12. 3A(10)(C) THE PROPOSED ACQUISITIONS BY THE GOL
ARE NON-SOPHISTICATED, BASIC MATERIEL, WHICH DO NOT
HAVE AN ARMS CONTROL IMPACT.

13. 3A(11) TO THE EXTENT THAT THE ARMED FORCES OF
LIBERIA ENGAGE IN A MODEST PRODUCTION AND ROAD-BUILDING
PROGRAM, USING MATERIEL SUPPLIED THROUGH SECURITY
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ASSISTANCE, THEY CONTRIBUTE TO THE GENERAL NATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND -- IN THIS WAY -- CAN BE SAID TO
PROMOTE "HUMAN RIGHTS" TO A BETTER MATERIAL LIFE.
OTHERWISE, THERE IS NO DISCERNIBLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS AND THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS IN LIBERIA. RECENT ITEMS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS
ARENA, SUCH AS THE PASSAGE BY THE LEGISLATURE IN
APRIL OF A MORE LIBERAL SEDITION LAW AND THE EMERGENCE
OF A NASCENT OPPOSITION POLITICAL PARTY, OCCURRED
INDEPENDENTLY OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT AND U.S.
SECURITY ASSISTANCE. GIVEN THE RELATIVELY GOOD RECORD

OF THE GOL IN HUMAN RIGHTS AND ITS SENSITIVITY TO ANY FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS, WE BELIEVE AN ATTEMPT ARTIFICALLY TO FIND SOME WAY -- MERELY FOR THE SAKE OF DOING SO -- TO LINK SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO HUMAN RIGHTS WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE.

14. 3A(12)(C) THE GOL IS RECEIVING SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM THE WORLD BANK GROUP, ARAB DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. FOR FY 79, FOREIGN FINANCING OTHER THAN AMERICAN TOTALS ABOUT \$65 MILLION. THE U.S. CURRENTLY IS THE SOLE PROVIDER OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

15. 3A(13) LEVELS OF PROPOSED SECURITY ASSISTANCE. THE LEVELS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE AS STATED BELOW ARE BASED ON A CURRENT FMS LEVEL OF \$1.2 MILLION AND AN IMET LEVEL OF \$225,000 THAT CONSTITUTE THE MINIMUM, "BARE BONES" LEVEL OF ASSISTANCE RECOMMENDED IN REFS E, F, G, AND H FOR FY 79. (THE PROGRAM PROJECTED IN FY 79 CPD WAS \$400,000. SUBSEQUENTLY, AGREEMENT WAS REACHED, AS DETAILED IN THE REFERENCES, TO SUPPORT AN ADJUSTMENT TO THE CPD PROGRAM.) THIS IS DRASTICALLY BELOW THE
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LEVEL OF ASSISTANCE TO BE REQUESTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA AS STATED IN THE FY 80 - 84 MSAP. THE \$1.2 MILLION LEVEL REPRESENTS THE LEVEL BELOW WHICH THE OBJECTIVES OF TACTICAL FORCE MODERNIZATION, REPLENISHMENT OF SUPPORT EQUIPMENT, EXPANSION OF THE COAST GUARD AND MAINTENANCE OF THE AIRWING CANNOT BE SUPPORTED. THE CREDIT LEVEL CURRENTLY PROJECTED IN THE CPD IS TOTALLY INADEQUATE. FURTHER CALCULATIONS BASED ON THAT PROJECTION ARE MEANINGLESS. LEVELS 1 AND 2 STATED BELOW, GEARED TO THE REDUCTION OF PROPOSED PROGRAMS IN THE AFL, WILL RESULT IN A CONTINUING DECLINE IN CAPABILITIES OF THE ARMED FORCES.

PROPOSED SECURITY
ASSISTANCE
FINANCING
(\$1,000'S)

	FY80		FY81		FY82	
	FMS	IMET	FMS	IMET	FMS	IMET
LEVEL 1	535	100	635	100	660	100
LEVEL 2	876	150	864	150	885	150
LEVEL 3	1,200	225	1,130	225	1,200	225
INCREMENTAL	1,300	225	1,130	250	2,204	285

ASSESSMENT OF LEVELS:

LEVEL 1 (FMS): THIS LEVEL WILL PERMIT LIMITED
CONTINUATION OF THE TACTICAL FORCE MODERNIZATION BUT AT
A MUCH SLOWER PACE THAN IS DESIRABLE. IT PROVIDES
SMALL AMOUNTS OF AMMUNITION, SUPPORT VEHICLES AND
EQUIPMENT BUT NOT AT A RATE WHICH WILL KEEP PACE WITH
NATURAL ATTRITION OF THESE ITEMS. IMPROVEMENT OF THE
COAST GUARD WOULD BE LIMITED TO ONE 65-FOOT PATROL BOAT
IN FY 82 INSTEAD OF THE PGM CLASS BOAT DESIRED BY
LIBERIA. FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL WOULD PRECLUDE PURCHASE
OF NEEDED ENGINEER EQUIPMENT TO CONTINUE CURRENT BASE
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DEVELOPMENT AND CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS.

RISK/BENEFIT ASSESSMENT: AT THIS LEVEL THE
IMPROVEMENT IN ONE AREA (TACTICAL FORCE MODERNIZATION)
WOULD NOT RESULT IN DEGRADATION OF CAPABILITY IN OTHER
AREAS (ENGINEERS, LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FORCES,
COAST GUARD). GOL DISSATISFACTION WITH FUNDING LEVELS
COULD RESULT IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE BEING SOUGHT FROM
OTHER COUNTRIES OR, IN THE WORST CASE, SERIOUS QUESTION-
ING WITHIN THE GOL OF THE BENEFITS OF CONTINUED CLOSE
ASSOCIATION WITH THE U.S.

LEVEL 1 (IMTE):

A. DESCRIPTION. A COMPREHENSIVE COMPOSITE
IMET PROGRAM CANNOT BE DEVELOPED AT THIS LEVEL. THIS
PROGRAM ALLOWS ONLY TEN OR TWELVE STUDENTS TO BE

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ARA-10 MMO-01 MCE-00 DLOS-09 /129 W
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FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA

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INFO SECDEF WASHDC

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERMANY/ECJ4/7

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DEPARTMENT PASS ACDA, AID/W

SECDEF FOR JCS

TRAINED IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANNOT PROVIDE FOR
MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS TAILORED TO SPECIFIC LIBERIAN
NEEDS.

B. RISK ASSESSMENT. DUE TO THE
REDUCTION OF FUNDS AND THE INCREASES IN TRAVEL AND
TUITION COSTS, FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL RETARDS THE
DEVELOPMENT OF A MANAGERIAL CAPABILITY WITHIN THE COMMAND
AND STAFF STRUCTURES OF THE ARMED FORCES OF LIBERIA
(AFL, DELAYS THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTERNAL TRAINING
BASE, PROLONGS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN OPERATIONAL MAINTENANCE
MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY AND REDUCES THE AMOUNT OF
U.S. INFLUENCE OBTAINED FROM LIBERIAN MILITARY STUDENT
CONTACT WITH U.S. CULTURE AND MILITARY TRAINING.

LEVEL 2X (FMS):

FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL WOULD SUPPORT THE
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TACTICAL FORCE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM BUT STILL AT A
SLOWER RATE THAN THE ONE BATTALION PER YEAR SCHEDULE.
ACQUISITION OF REQUIRED AMMUNITION WAR RESERVE WOULD BE
STARTED BUT AT A SLOWER THAN OPTIMUM PACE. THIS LEVEL
WOULD PERMIT THE ACQUISITION OF ONE AIRCRAFT IN FY 81
AND THE VEHICLE REPLENISHMENT PROGRAM COULD BE PURSUED.
ENGINEER EQUIPMENT REPLACEMENT COULD NOT BE FULLY
EFFECTED AND THE BASE DEVELOPMENT AND CIVIC ACTION
CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM WOULD SUFFER AS A RESULT. COAST
GUARD MODERNIZATION WOULD STILL BE LIMITED TO THE
ACQUISITION OF ONE 65 FOOT COAST PATROL BOAT VICE THE
DESIRED PGM. THIS IS, IN THE EYES OF THE AFL, AN
UNSATISFACTORY SITUATION.

A. RISK ASSESSMENT: FUNDING AT THIS
LEVEL BY NOT SUPPORTING THE TIMELY ACQUISITION OF
ADEQUATE LEVELS OF AMMUNITION OR THE REQUIRED SMALL ARMS
DELAYS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REQUIRED MINIMUM DEFENSIVE
CAPABILITY. THE FAILURE TO SUPPORT THE FUNDING OF THE
COAST GUARD PATROL BOAT WILL PROBABLY PROMPT THE AFL
TO LOOK ELSEWHERE FOR FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF THE COAST
GUARD MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.

LEVEL 2 (IMET):

A. DESCRIPTION . THIS LEVEL ALLOWS THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPOSITE IMET PROGRAM WHERE TEN TO TWELVE STUDENTS RECEIVE TRAINING IN THE UNITED STATES AND A MOBILE TRAINING TEAM CAN BE SCHEDULED. APPROXIMATELY 200 TO 300 STUDENTS CAN BENEFIT DIRECTLY FROM THE MOBILE TRAINING TEAM AND 500 STUDENTS CAN INDIRECTLY BENEFIT FROM IT.

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B. RISK ASSESSMENT. FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL DOES NOT ACCELERATE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMAND AND STAFF MANAGERIAL CAPABILITY, HARD TECHNICAL SKILLS OR A MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. U.S. INFLUENCE IN THE FORMS OF TRAINING AND CULTURAL CONTACTS IS EXTENDED TO SMALL STUDENT BASE.

LEVEL 3 (FMS): THIS LEVEL SUPPORTS ALL PROGRAMS AND THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ALL OBJECTIVES EXCEPT FOR THE MODERNIZATION OF THE COAST GUARD. AS ACQUISITION OF A PGM PATROL BOAT WILL COST AT LEAST \$1.5 MILLION, THE COAST GUARD PROGRAM CANNOT BE SUPPORTED WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS OF THIS FUNDING LEVEL.

INCREMENTAL: AN INCREMENTAL LEVEL TOTALLING \$2.2 MILLION IN FY 82 WILL SUPPORT THE ACQUISITION OF THE NEEDED COAST GUARD PATROL BOAT. FUNDING AT LEVEL 3 FOR FY 80 AND FY 81 AND AT THE INCREMENTAL LEVEL FOR FY 82 WILL PROVIDE THE FINANCIAL MEANS TO MEET ALL USG SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES.

LEVEL 3 (IMET):

A. DESCRIPTION. THIS LEVEL ALLOWS A COMPREHENSIVE, COMPOSITE IMET PROGRAM FOR LIBERIA TO BE DEVELOPED AND PROVIDES SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO PROGRAM TWENTY MILITARY STUDENTS TO ATTEND TRAINING IN THE UNITED STATES AND TO SCHEDULE MULTIPLE MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS IN THE AREAS OF LOGISTICS, TRAINING AND COAST GUARD ACTIVITIES. APPROXIMATELY 300 MILITARY PERSONNEL WILL BENEFIT INDIRECTLY FROM THE MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS. HOWEVER, IF THIS LEVEL IS MAINTAINED DURING THE OUT YEARS, FY 81 AND FY 82, NOTICEABLE REDUCTION IN THE QUANTITY OF TRAINING RECEIVED WILL OCCUR DUE TO INCREASES IN TRANSPORTATION, LIVING ALLOWANCE AND SCHOOL TUITION COSTS. THIS REDUCTION IN TRAINING CAN BE MANIFESTED

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BY THE REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF LIBERIAN STUDENTS ATTENDING TRAINING IN THE UNITED STATES, BY THE CURTAILMENT OF THE SIZE AND NUMBER OF MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS PRESENT IN LIBERIA OR BY A COMBINATION OF THE TWO. INCREMENTAL INCREASES IN IMETP FUNDING ARE NECESSARY IN THE OUT YEARS. DUE TO INCREASES IN TRAVEL, LIVING AND TUITION COSTS, A GROWTH IN IMETP FUNDING OF FIFTEEN PERCENT PER ANNUM IS NECESSARY IN THE OUT YEARS, FY 81 AND FY 82, IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE CURRENT LEVEL OF IMETP TRAINING WHICH IS CONSIDERED TO BE AN ADEQUATE LEVEL OF IMETP TRAINING.

B. BENEFIT ASSESSMENT. FUNDING OF THE IMET PROGRAM AT THIS LEVEL DEVELOPS AN IMPROVED COMMAND AND STAFF MANAGERIAL CAPABILITY, ACCELERATES THE DEVELOPMENT OF HARD TECHNICAL SKILLS, PROVIDES A WIDER TRAINING BASE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNAL TRAINING CAPABILITY, AND EXTENDS U.S. INFLUENCE BY PROVIDING U.S. CULTURAL AND MILITARY TRAINING ENVIRONMENTAL CONTACTS TO A LARGER STUDENT BASE.

16. 3A(13)(F) SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANNING LEVELS:
FY 89, FY 81, FY 82:

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ARA-10 MMO-01 MCE-00 DLOS-09 /129 W
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FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0150
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERMANY/ECJ4/7

S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 6 MONROVIA 5272

DEPARTMENT PASS ACDA, AID/W

SECDEF FOR JCS

	MILITARY	DAC	LWR
LEVEL 1	4	1	1
LEVEL 2	5	1	2
LEVEL 3	6	1	2
INCREMENTAL		6	2 2

LEVEL 1 (DISCUSSION): MANNING AT THIS LEVEL REDUCES THE CAPABILITY OF THE U.S. MILITARY MISSION (THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY IN LIBERIA) TO STRICTLY ACCOUNTING AND ADMINISTRATION TASKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM PLUS A BASIC MILITARY REPRESENTATIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. REDUCTION TO THIS LEVEL MIGHT SERIOUSLY DISTURB THE GOL WHICH HAS RELIED ON THE STAFF AND MINISTERIAL ADVICE/ASSISTANCE PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED BY THE U.S. MILITARY MISSION. SINCE THE AFL REQUIRES NIGHER STAFF LEVEL ASSISTANCE, THEY MAY SEEK THE HELP THEY NEED ELSEWHERE. THIS WOULD REDUCE THE INFLUENCE THE SECRET

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UNITED STATES HAS ENJOYED IN DEFENSE-RELATED MATTERS AND REDUCE THE CONFIDENCE IN U.S. RELIABILITY. MANNING AT THIS LEVEL WOULD MAKE ATTAINMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT'S OBJECTIVE FOR LIBERIA OF MAINTAINING THE CLOSE AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE U.S. MILITARY MISSION/LIBERIA AND THE DEFENSE AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA VERY DIFFICULT. FURTHERMORE, AT THIS LEVEL IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN AN ARMED FORCE POSTAL SERVICE.

LEVEL 2: MANNING AT THIS LEVEL WOULD ENABLE THE U.S. MILITARY MISSION TO ACCOMPLISH THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION REQUIREMENTS BUT WOULD LIMIT THE ABILITY OF USMM TO PROVIDE MEANINGFUL STAFF ADVICE TO THE AFL GENERAL STAFF AND DEFENSE MINISTERIAL STAFF. THE RESULTING DECREASE IN INFLUENCE WOULD DEGRADE USMM'S CAPABILITY TO EFFECT THE USE OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE ASSETS OR TO RESTRAIN AFL PLANNERS FROM UNDERTAKING UNWISE ACTIVITIES. THE ABILITY TO SUPERVISE AND ADMINISTER PROGRAMMED MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS WOULD BE SERIOUSLY DEGRADED. IT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE TO CONTINUE TO PROVIDE MILITARY POSTAL SERVICE AT THIS LEVEL.

LEVEL 3: MANNING AT THE CURRENT LEVEL ENABLES THE MILITARY MISSION TO MANAGE ADEQUATELY THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM BUT RESULTS IN A SEVERELY CONSTRAINED

GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPABILITY. IT PROVIDES THE MINIMUM LEVEL AT WHICH IT CAN BE REASONABLY EXPECTED THAT U.S. INFLUENCE IN DEFENSE MATTERS WILL NOT BE SIGNIFICANTLY DEGRADED. A MODEST CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AFL'S MANAGERIAL SKILLS IS RETAINED.

INCREMENTAL: MANNING AT THIS LEVEL WOULD PROVIDE THE MINIMALLY ADEQUATE CAPABILITY OF LEVEL 3, BUT BY
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THE AUGMENTATION OF ONE CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATIVE SPACE WOULD MAKE POSSIBLE A MUCH NEEDED IMPROVEMENT IN ADMINISTRATIVE CAPABILITY, AND GO FAR TO INSURE ADEQUATE CONTROL AND SUPPORT OF PROGRAMMED MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS.
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